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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Speeding is a public-health crisis, implicated in roughly a third of roadway deaths each year in the United 
States. One countermeasure with clearly documented efficacy to reduce speed and the severity of 
crashes is automated speed enforcement (ASE). Despite the demonstrated safety benefits of ASE, it is 
only being deployed in approximately 142 communities across the United States, and some states ban 
the practice altogether. Politically, ASE is a controversial issue, with many drivers questioning the 
legality of ASE and the need to improve speed enforcement. In Minnesota, ASE is not being utilized and 
would require legislative action to be implemented. 
The purpose of this study, which focuses on Minnesota’s potential ASE use, was threefold: to investigate 
attitudes toward ASE among stakeholders in Minnesota who would be involved in deployment of ASE; to 
quantitatively compare the rates of motor fatalities in states using ASE to Minnesota rates in work 
zones; and better understand the causes for the continued conflict regarding ASE deployment among 
the general Minnesota population and identify potential avenues for reconciling this conflict.  
To investigate stakeholder attitudes toward ASE, we conducted 18 in-person interviews of professionals 
in four fields relevant to ASE deployment. We asked each interviewee a range of questions designed to 
elucidate their ideas and attitudes surrounding ASE. The stakeholder interviews revealed some level of 
support for ASE within each stakeholder category, especially when ASE was supported by strong data 
showing its positive benefits, and implemented in way that prevents abuse. Ten categories where 
respondents took issue with deployment of ASE were also identified through the interviews, and we 
plotted these categories on a position-basis matrix. The matrix is a four-quadrant graph, with various 
arguments placed on a two-dimensional scale.1 The horizontal axis measures the interviewee’s position 
regarding automated speed enforcement, from opposition (left) to support (right). The vertical axis 
measures the basis for that position and ranges from debatable (bottom) to not debatable (top), with 
“debatable” referring to areas in which interviewees were open to movement when information 
contrary to their initial opinion, and “not debatable” referring to areas in which interviewees held 
unshakable beliefs unlikely to change even in the face of contrary information. 
 
                                                          
1 Please note that we are not judging the validity or strength of these arguments based on the quadrant titles or 
placement on the matrix. Rather, the matrix is mainly an analytical tool to help organize and visualize the various 
arguments and positions. 
  
 
Position-Basis Matrix 
 
We used roadway fatality data from the Fatal Accident Reports System (FARS) to perform the 
quantitative comparison in this study. We focused on the years 2004-2013 and compared the rates and 
numbers of work zone fatalities in Minnesota and the nine states (plus the District of Columbia) that 
deploy ASE in work zones. The quantitative aspect of this study did not reveal a quantifiable difference 
in work zone fatality statistics in Minnesota compared with the jurisdictions that deploy ASE in work 
zones.  
To better understand causes for continued conflict surrounding ASE among the general Minnesota 
population, we distributed a survey with questions informed by the areas of concern identified in the 
interviews of Minnesota stakeholders. The surveys of general members of the Minnesota population 
found that 100 of the 203 respondents had favorable opinions of ASE upon entering the survey, and that 
there is broad public support for limited forms of ASE deployment, such as in school or work zones. The 
survey also revealed that a significant portion of people who are against or unsure about ASE can be 
persuaded to think better of it by addressing their key concerns and misconceptions. For instance, 
providing information about the safety impacts of speed can move someone with a negative opinion of 
ASE in a positive direction. Even for those respondents who did not change their opinions of ASE when 
provided with information favorable to ASE implementation, most were not further polarized into 
rejection of ASE, indicating a good dialog was achieved and further entrenchment into negative views 
was not a result of the engagement with most of the participants. 
Overall, this study finds that negative perceptions of ASE are often related to misunderstandings about 
ASE and the public safety threat posed by speeding. Framing the use of ASE as a clear and effective 
safety tool to address a serious public health problem will increase public support for its deployment. 
Because large majorities in several surveys approve of its use in high-risk areas like school and work 
zones and where people often speed excessively, limited ASE deployment may be a useful foothold to 
gaining more support for expanded implementation of ASE. 
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CHAPTER 1:  AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SPEEDING 
Independent research has shown that the deployment of automated speed enforcement (ASE) is 
effective in reducing average speed and crashes of most types (1). Moreover, ASE reduces crash-related 
personal injuries (2) and fatalities (3). ASE has the greatest potential in reducing serious injury and fatal 
crashes where traditional law enforcement efforts are less effective such as in rural areas where crash 
rates are high (4), average daily traffic is low, and high speeds are prevalent (5). Despite consistent 
evidence, use of ASE remains highly contentious (6), as demonstrated by legislative prohibitions in some 
states (7) and at the federal level (8).  
Compared with 19 other high-income countries, the United States has the most motor vehicle fatalities 
per 100,000 population and per 10,000 registered vehicles (9). Speeding greatly contributes to the 
frequency and severity of motor vehicle fatalities; it is the leading factor involved in fatal crashes, 
equivalent to the impact the use of drugs, alcohol, and medication and distracted driving combined (10). 
In 2013, approximately one third of all fatal crashes (9,613) included speed as a contributing factor (11). 
The proportion of speed-related fatal crashes has remained stable at around 30 percent of total fatal 
crashes since 2007.  
Drivers often underestimate the risks of traveling at high speeds (12). Speeding increases inherent 
driving risks by reducing a driver’s safe maneuverability around curves or hazards in the roadway, 
requires increased safe stopping distance, and increases the distance a vehicle may travel during a 
critical situation (13). Moreover, higher driving speeds mean higher speeds at impact and hence greater 
impact force. Greater impact forces reduce the effectiveness of vehicle safety systems (e.g., seatbelts, 
crumple-zones, and air-bags) and roadway safety hardware (e.g., guardrails, barriers, and impact 
attenuators) (13, 14). Speed-related crashes also generate an enormous economic burden. For example, 
in 2010, crashes where at least one driver was exceeding the legal speed limit or driving too fast for 
conditions cost $51.9 billion in direct costs and $203 billion in comprehensive costs (e.g., health 
insurance costs, lost productivity due to traffic, and other opportunity costs) (15).  
Therefore, it is of concern that Americans value driving at high speeds: Surveying U.S. drivers, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) found one-third agreed with the statement “I 
enjoy the feeling of speed,” and more than half said they often get impatient with slower drivers (16). 
Unsurprisingly then, Americans exceed the speed limit with some regularity. A 2003 survey of four U.S. 
states found 11 percent to 78 percent of drivers exceeded the 55 mph speed limits by 15 mph or more. 
In two states with 75 mph limits on rural interstates, 10 percent to 24 percent of drivers drove faster 
than 80 mph (17). The most recent data (2011) also shows that the likelihood of speeding does vary by 
gender and age: as depicted in Figure 1 below, the percentage of fatal crashes involving male speeders 
substantially outnumbers that of female speeders in every age group until 75+ and the percentage of 
fatal crashes involving speeding decreases as drivers age (10). 
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Figure 1. Percent of speeding drivers in fatal crashes by age and gender, 2011 
(Source: NHTSA) 
 
1.2 AUTOMATED SPEED ENFORCEMENT 
Automated speed enforcement (ASE) has been described as a method of traffic enforcement so 
fundamentally different from traditional methods of enforcement that it has significantly altered 
citizens' basic expectations of law enforcement (18). ASE is a safety system that can improve operational 
safety by providing certainty that drivers who exceed the posted speed limit will receive the appropriate 
sanction. Modern, automated photo-radar equipment was deployed in pilot ASE trials in the 1980s (19, 
20). By 1998, automated photo-radar was described as "one of America's hottest new trends in traffic 
control" (20). Today, there are approximately 142 communities across several states using photo-radar 
systems (21).  
ASE deployment results in a reduction of average speeds and in most types of crashes while reducing 
the number and severity of both injurious and fatal speed-related crashes (1-3). As one example, in a 
review of the ASE system deployed throughout Montgomery County, Maryland, the Insurance Institute 
for Highway Safety found speed cameras were associated with a 10 percent reduction in average speeds 
and a 59 percent reduction in the likelihood that a vehicle was driving more than 10 mph above posted 
speed limits at ASE sites. They also reported a 19 percent reduction in the likelihood that a crash 
resulted in a debilitating or fatal injury (22). Other research has shown network-wide reductions in 
speeds (i.e., “halo effects”) beyond demarcated ASE zones (23). 
Despite these demonstrated safety benefits, deployment of ASE continues to be an exceedingly 
controversial issue (6). Several states have enacted restrictions (24-27) or banned the use of photo-radar 
(7, 28-30). Moreover, ASE systems have been rejected in a number of public referendums (31). In Region 
5, only Ohio (32) and Illinois (33) permit ASE, and Illinois is the only state that articulates further 
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deployment in its Strategic Highway Safety Plan. Further, use of cameras for speed enforcement is illegal 
in Wisconsin (7).2 Although not part of Region 5, Iowa state statute may be instructive for states within 
Region 5 considering ASE. “Automated traffic enforcement,” as it is called in Iowa, is widely deployed 
across the state. Furthermore, the technology survived a number of legal challenges, including a class 
action suit in federal court (34), state and federal constitutional due process and inalienable rights 
challenges (35), 3 and preemption challenges (36).4 
1.2.1 Research Objectives 
This report will focus on Minnesota’s potential ASE use. The focus on Minnesota is appropriate given 
that automated enforcement received significant attention in its 2007 Strategic Highway Safety Plan (37) 
and was listed as a potential strategy, but with reduced emphasis, again in its 2014 plan (38). Progress 
on ASE, however, halted after a court decision voided deployment of red-light cameras in Minneapolis 
(39), which created the perception that ASE is unconstitutional in Minnesota. While the grounds were 
merely legal (not constitutional) and thus the Minnesota legislature has the power to change the law 
cited in the case and allow deployment, misunderstandings regarding the grounds for the decision and 
emboldened opposition to camera deployment have dampened enthusiasm for introducing bills that 
would do so (40). Lessons from the intricacies of the public discussion of the issue and resulting lack of 
progress in Minnesota may be applicable in other states. 
This report contains the results of three distinct, but correlated, investigations into ASE and its 
deployment in Minnesota. The aim of the first investigation was to better understand the arguments for 
and against ASE held by influential Minnesota stakeholders. The aim of the second investigation was to 
quantitatively compare the rates of motor fatalities in states using ASE to Minnesota rates. The aim of 
the third investigation was to better understand the causes for the continued conflict regarding ASE 
deployment among the general Minnesota population and potentially identify avenues for reconciling 
this conflict.   
                                                          
2 This statute states: “(a) In this subsection, “photo radar speed detection” means the detection of a vehicle's speed 
by use of a radar device combined with photographic identification of the vehicle. (b) Notwithstanding sub. (1), the 
state and local authorities may not use photo radar speed detection to determine compliance with any speed 
restriction imposed by s. 346.57, 346.58, 346.59, 346.595 or 349.11 or a local ordinance in conformity therewith.”  
3 Holding that an ATE ordinance, consistent with concepts of due process, may rationally impose liability on a 
defendant when the defendant concedes he is the registered owner of a vehicle, that he owns the vehicle involved in 
the infraction, and he offers no evidence that he was not driving the vehicle when the infraction occurred. 
4 Holding that ATE ordinance was not preempted by traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms of state 
statutes. 
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CHAPTER 2:  STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This qualitative research via in-person interviews attempted to more clearly articulate the differing 
points of view among the different stakeholders that would be involved in deployment of ASE. The 
purpose of the interviews was to identify commonalities and discrepancies among different stakeholder 
groups’ knowledge about ASE, their attitudes about the barriers and opportunities presented by ASE, 
and their perception of others’ attitudes about ASE. 
2.2 METHODS 
2.2.1 Stakeholder Selection 
Through review of scholarly papers, legislative testimony, news reports and other records on the topic, 
we drafted a “stakeholder map”, identifying expected categories and perspectives of those involved in 
this discussion, as well as potential sources of influence, both among the groups identified, and external 
to them. This map was then used to identify specific individuals in each category and contact them for 
interviews on speeding and ASE. Interviews were done via surveys and structured questions with key 
members of the affected institutions, both inside and outside of government.  
We conducted 18 interviews, with a few individuals from each of four stakeholder categories. The “Non-
Enforcement Government” stakeholder category included state and local elected officials, state 
executive department officers, businesses and non-profits, and policy think-tanks and lobbying interests. 
The “Public Health” stakeholder category included state, county, and local public health officials from 
urban, suburban, and rural communities. Interviews with the “Law Enforcement” stakeholder category 
attempted to capture a range of perspectives including the Minnesota State Patrol, county sheriffs, and 
municipal police departments. The “Judicial” stakeholder category included judges and magistrates. 
Effort was made to ensure that questions asked of judges avoided breaching any relevant ethical 
obligations. We purposely created a pool of respondents representative of roles within each category, 
the rural-suburban-urban divides, and both major political parties. 
2.2.2 Interviews and Their Analysis 
Topics for the interviews included perspectives on differences between automated and in-person 
enforcement (penalties, period of enforcement, opportunities to interact), use of the revenue generated 
by automated enforcement, the extent of deployment, and privacy concerns associated with ASE. 
Finally, we requested respondents to articulate circumstances where ASE could potentially be deployed. 
We with the University of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure compliance with 
University policies. To encourage open discussion, individual names and interview transcripts were held 
in strict confidence. Direct quotations used in this paper were not attributed to the source, but rather 
identified only by the stakeholder group to which the speaker belonged. After conducting the 
interviews, we reviewed past recommendations for ASE deployment and identified new strategies for 
deployment in an attempt to address the needs and concerns expressed by these groups.  
We used word clouds to visualize and analyze the qualitative data gathered through the stakeholder 
interviews. To create these word clouds, first we transcribed our stakeholder interviews. Then, we 
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removed our interview questions, leaving only the interviewees’ responses. Then, we used WordItOut, 
an online tool, to visualize these responses. In total, we generated five word clouds, one for the entire 
interview pool and one for each stakeholder group (41). The word clouds are featured and described 
below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Entire Interview Pool Word Cloud 
As evidenced by the prominence of the words “support” and “public” in the word cloud for our 
conversations with all four stakeholder groups (Figure 2), each conversation involved discussion of the 
nature of public and stakeholder support (or lack thereof) for ASE. The word “officer” points to recurring 
mentions of the possible effects of ASE on the job of law enforcement officers, and the nature of law 
enforcement officer support for the ASE. Interestingly, “safety” and “revenue” appear the same size, 
and represent the two possible motivations for ASE implementation discussed by the interviewees. 
While this general word cloud points to some trends across stakeholder groups, the word clouds 
corresponding to each separate stakeholder group reveal significant differences in themes emphasized 
by each stakeholder group. 
 
6 
 
 
Figure 3. Non-Enforcement Government Stakeholder Interviews Word Cloud 
 
 “Revenue” appears larger in the word cloud for our interviews with Non-Enforcement Government 
stakeholders than any of the others (Figure 3). This indicates broad recognition among Non-
Enforcement Government interviewees that revenue is central to the debate over ASE, both as a selling 
point and source of public concern. “Citation,” often mentioned during discussions of revenue, also 
appears prominently. The word cloud also demonstrates Non-Enforcement Government interviewees’ 
recognition of other dimensions of the debate surrounding ASE, such as concerns over “privacy” and 
benefits regarding “safety.” 
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Figure 4. Public Health Stakeholder Interviews Word Cloud 
The word cloud corresponding to our conversations with Public Health stakeholders (Figure 4) 
demonstrates that the interviewed public health practitioners kept speed at the center of the 
conversation. They emphasized themes such as changing driver behavior and changing the perception 
that speed is not a major problem. Public Health stakeholders were also the group most concerned with 
reducing the severity of crashes. As one might expect, the Public Health interviewees spoke of 
transportation as a public health issue with implications for safety, mental health and physical activity 
levels, repeating words like “crosswalk,” “injury,” “safer,” “engineering,” “environment,” “livability” and 
“active”. However, they were not blind to practical and legal considerations regarding ASE 
implementation, regularly referring to “cost,” “revenue,” “law” and other terms, suggesting an 
awareness that those outside the public health sphere might view ASE in more logistical, financial or 
procedural terms. 
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Figure 5. Law Enforcement Stakeholder Word Cloud 
Like Public Health interviewees, Law Enforcement interviewees spoke regularly of speed, but unlike 
Public Health interviewees, discussed ASE largely in procedural terms. As shown in the corresponding 
word cloud (Figure 5), the Law Enforcement interviewees repeated procedural words like “citation,” 
“implementation,” “court,” “administrative,” and “penalty,” and spoke frequently of the potential effect 
of ASE on the work and safety of the “officer.” The procedural focus of the Law Enforcement 
interviewees is not unexpected, as law enforcement officials play a major role in implementing ASE and 
public dissatisfaction with how ASE is carried out is likely to be predominantly directed at law 
enforcement. In a similar fashion, the Law Enforcement interviewees were concerned with public 
opinion (repeating words like “public,” “negative,” and “opposition”), as law enforcement agencies are 
concerned with their credibility with the public. Along these lines, both “limited deployment” and “work 
zone” appear in the word cloud, suggesting the narrow implementation of ASE could earn the support of 
law enforcement. Lastly, the word “constitution” appeared regularly in Law Enforcement stakeholder 
interviews, pointing to the uncertainty within the law enforcement community regarding the 
constitutionality of ASE. 
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Figure 6. Judicial Stakeholder Interviews Word Cloud 
Words related to safety and livability are mostly absent from the word cloud corresponding to our 
conversation with Judicial stakeholders (Figure 6), which is dominated by words evoking the mechanics 
of the judicial system (examples include “citation,” “law,” and “offenders”). The presence of the terms 
“misdemeanor” and “administrative” recognizes two different levels of severity of speeding violations, 
and how citations generated by ASE systems are likely to primarily be classified as administrative 
offenses. “Warning” refers to discussions of how on-site law enforcement officers have the discretion to 
issue a citation or a warning when they pull a motorist over for speeding, whereas ASE systems lack this 
subjective capacity for discretion. “Time” is prominent in the word cloud because of conversations 
about the amount of time between the speeding violation and the moment at which the motorist learns 
of the citation; when a motorist is issued a citation by an on-site law enforcement officer, the motorist 
learns of the citation immediately after committing the violation, whereas an ASE system informs 
(typically by mail) the motorist of the citation well after the violation. “Volume” appears in the word 
cloud because of concerns among judicial stakeholders about how ASE has the potential to increase the 
volume of citations the judiciary is responsible for processing. 
The word clouds influenced the quadrant names for the Position-Basis Matrix (Figure 7), which we 
developed to visualize and categorize the issues raised by interviewees. In this way, we identified the 
top arguments for and against the use of ASE. Then, we qualitatively coded the statements to fall within 
basic categories of arguments c. Based upon this information, we sought out potential areas of 
disagreement and agreement, and areas ripe for collaboration.  
2.3 RESULTS 
Most interviews lasted close to an hour and produced a range of comments, ideas, and arguments for 
and against ASE. Most suggested some level of support, especially if supported by strong data showing 
positive benefits and implemented in a way that prevents abuse. Ten categories where respondents 
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took issue with deployment of ASE were identified. These ten categories (which are not in any particular 
order) include: 
 Constitutional issues 
 The lack of enforcement discretion in automated systems 
 The general driving culture of Minnesota drivers 
 The safety benefits of ASE 
 How the system will be deployed 
 The implications of huge amounts of data gathered by ASE 
 The public’s opinion 
 The financial aspects of ASE 
 Fear of big government 
 Privacy both of the general public and specific individuals  
The Non-Enforcement Government stakeholders did not talk about speed, but rather moved right in to 
reasons to support or oppose ASE. On the other hand, the Law Enforcement and Public Health 
stakeholders kept speed in the center of their discussion. Although each had very different perspectives, 
Law Enforcement was concerned with procedure (i.e., enforcing speed laws in a way that will change 
behavior) while public health took a more holistic view, considering a wide variety of factors that could 
impact a driver’s decision to speed.  
The categories are organized around the Position-Basis Matrix. The four quadrants are titled (in 
clockwise order, starting in top left):  
 Deal-breakers 
 Must-have Benefits 
 Alliances  
 Implementation Issues 
The matrix is a four-quadrant graph, with various arguments placed on a two-dimensional scale.5 The 
horizontal axis measures the interviewee’s position regarding automated speed enforcement, from 
opposition (left) to support (right). The vertical axis measures the basis for that position and ranges from 
debatable (bottom) to not debatable (top), with “debatable” referring to areas in which interviewees 
were open to movement when information contrary to their initial opinion, and “not debatable” 
referring to areas in which interviewees held unshakable beliefs unlikely to change even in the face of 
contrary information. The following section attempts to present the breadth and depth of commentary 
from the interviews.  
 
                                                          
5 Please note that we are not judging the validity or strength of these arguments based on the quadrant titles or 
placement on the matrix. Rather, the matrix is mainly an analytical tool to help organize and visualize the various 
arguments and positions. 
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Figure 7. Position-Basis Matrix 
 
2.3.1 Deal-Breakers 
The title for this quadrant was chosen because it consists of arguments and issues that many cite as 
fundamental reasons to oppose ASE. According to some interviewees, these are positions that are more 
or less intractable, or very difficult to overcome. As such, they are deal breakers, and entirely prevent 
ASE from becoming reality in Minnesota. Several statements are quoted and described below. Such 
beliefs prompted us to conduct further background research on three major constitutional issues—due 
process and equal protection clauses, privacy, and vicarious liability.  
2.3.1.1 Constitutionality of ASE 
As one interviewee asked: “Does the constitution make a difference?” Constitutional protections are the 
most frequently raised arguments opposing ASE. More specifically, many people, and several of the 
interviewees, believe that automated speed enforcement violates either the Due Process clause or the 
Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. For instance, one law enforcement officer stated: 
“Officers want to improve safety but constitutional issues make automated enforcement illegal.” 
Another stated simply, “automated enforcement is illegal.” Other stakeholders believed that the 
Minnesota constitution prohibited ASE. In fact, more than one interviewee said his/her colleagues 
believe ASE is illegal because of the State Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Kuhlman (42). This case was 
not, however, determined on constitutional grounds. Instead, Kuhlman turned on the fact that the state 
legislature had failed to give Minneapolis the authority to hold the owner of the vehicle responsible for 
the actions of the drivers in the instance of running a red right (39, 42). A Non-Enforcement Government 
interviewee stated that this understanding of the ruling is pervasive even among state legislators. More 
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problematic, one interviewee believed “this perception will be difficult and take a long time to 
overcome.” One Law Enforcement stakeholder expressed concerns about whether photographic 
evidence of speeding violations was sufficient to obtain a conviction in court. 
The frequency and veracity with which interviewees raised constitutional concerns inspired us to 
thoroughly examine the scholarly literature and case law behind these arguments. Constitutional issues 
have been asserted in challenges to ASE systems across the country, by both scholars and litigants. For 
example, some contend that such automatic ticketing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which is supposed to prevent the government “from abusing [its] power or employing it as 
an instrument of oppression” (43). Most commonly, opponents argue that a cited driver is considered 
guilty upon receiving a ticket and is only then given the opportunity to prove their innocence—the exact 
reverse of a maxim of the American legal system: innocent until proven guilty (44).  
Substantially all litigation founded in due process has been dismissed for jurisprudential reasons6 or has 
upheld the automated enforcement system. Courts have upheld systems even when a private company 
owns and operates the system and when the system generated significant revenues. Arguments that an 
owner is deprived of due process when an automated system uses first class or certified mail to and that 
a one-week delay in mailing the citation was prejudicial have been unsuccessful. An example of this is in 
the 8th Circuit, where the Northern District of Iowa recently dismissed a class action suit against the City 
of Cedar Rapids for a number of reasons (34). Several plaintiffs did not have a case or controversy 
sufficient to allow the court to decide the case. Those claims and plaintiffs that did have standing were 
also dismissed for several reasons. First, the fundamental right to travel is not infringed by the city’s ASE 
system. Thus, the municipal ordinance must be rationally related only to a legitimate government 
interest—a burden that it easily meets. Furthermore, the court dismissed claims that plaintiffs' 
procedural due process rights were denied because the city's operation of the system did not meet the 
Iowa DOT's rules for such systems. There is no authority that violation of state regulation implicates the 
due process clause. The nature and weight of the violation, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
property or rights are insufficient to raise a violation of the due process clause.  
The United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause is also a common argument raised against 
automated enforcement. This clause commands that no state shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike. Scholars have yet to probe the depths of an equal protection argument 
against automated speed enforcement, beyond describing litigation that asserted an equal protection 
challenge. Again, ASE systems are generally upheld as constitutionally valid in the face of equal 
protection challenges (44, 45). Under rational relation review, courts have refused to distinguish 
between drivers, owners, or dealers and manufacturers; locations where cameras are deployed; or 
drivers stopped by human law enforcement officers and those cited by automated systems. One equal 
protection challenge achieved limited success in overturning an ASE system in Ohio. This case turned, 
however, on the fact that warnings posted for mobile ASE systems were different from the warning 
posted for fixed systems (46). Other arguments include the vicarious liability of the registered owner for 
the driver’s violations (47) and when the burden of proving a case is switched from the state or city to 
forcing the driver to prove her/his innocence (48).  
                                                          
6 These are foundational thresholds that must be met for a case to be allowed in to court, for instance standing, 
ripeness, mootness, etc. 
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2.3.1.2 Officer Discretion 
Every stakeholder group mentioned whether or not an automated speed enforcement system would 
affect the discretion wielded by law enforcement officers. Law enforcement interviewees were 
particularly concerned with this issue. However, there does not appear to be a clear consensus among 
the interviewees about whether the effect would be positive or negative. One Law Enforcement 
respondent stated that regardless of the use of ASE, “officers would continue to conduct speed 
enforcement.” Another law enforcement officer stated that the impact on discretion would be a “non-
factor,” as ASE would just be “something extra” in the methods communities have to enforce their laws. 
One law enforcement officer suggested one positive of ASE would be the reduction in officers’ speed 
enforcement caseload, presumably because fewer people would be speeding.  
A few Non-Enforcement Government and Public Health stakeholders, and all Law Enforcement 
interviewees discussed how ASE might affect the enforcement of other laws. These interviewees 
suggested that implementing ASE “could reduce the number of stops made for reasons other than 
speeding.” Specifically, interviewees, especially law enforcement officers, were concerned that ASE 
would “remove the opportunity to find other, more serious violations, such as impaired drivers, felony 
warrants” and other major crimes. Furthermore, one law enforcement officer stated that human 
“officers would lose discretion with automated enforcement,” noting that an automated system would 
not have the ability to have a person-to-person interaction with a driver, but only automatically issue a 
ticket. 
2.3.1.3 Driving Culture 
Only Non-Enforcement Government and Public Health interviewees made statements about the 
prevailing “driving culture.” Generally, these comments appeared to be very much supportive of 
implementing ASE. For instance, “ASE presents an opportunity for the county to lead and be at the 
forefront of speed enforcement.” One high-ranking Non-Enforcement Government interviewee 
commented several times on the prevailing driving culture. This respondent stated that ASE may be the 
only way to get people to slow down, and that state and local authorities “have tried lots of other things 
that haven’t worked,” including signs, fines, education, and other tools. A Public Health interviewee 
stated that “the environment is not conducive to obey speed limit [sic]—police don’t even obey 
crosswalk laws.” In the same vein, another Public Health interviewee suggested that ASE would require 
a major change in behavior, but ultimately ASE could make people behave in a safer manner. Work-zone 
safety was a common topic among all stakeholders. One interviewee made a particularly interesting 
statement, saying that “currently, the public tends to speed up to get through work zones.” In response 
to this extremely risky driving behavior, “construction workers take informal measures to force drivers 
to slow down, including parking large vehicles close to traffic lanes, making lanes through work zones 
especially narrow, and even driving personal vehicles through the work zone slowly.” A Judicial 
interviewee recommended “building in structures to help people adjust behavior, such as advanced 
warnings with dynamic speed display signs of automated system and warnings for first time offenders, 
while also focusing the system on people who cannot or will not change.” In summary, many 
stakeholders believed that ASE might “help change driving culture and remind drivers that use of the 
roads is a privilege and not a right.” 
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2.3.2  Must-Have Benefit: Safety 
Arguably the single most important rationale for implementing automated speed enforcement is 
improving safety. Indeed, some might even contend that safety alone is a sufficient rationale for 
implementing ASE. Compellingly, most respondents in this research were interested to learn more about 
the safety impacts of ASE. In fact, many claimed that if the positive effect of automated enforcement 
was significant, they would support—not just consider, but advocate for—deploying automated 
enforcement. Based on the interviews we conducted, a significant measureable improvement in 
roadway safety is an absolute requisite for garnering public support for ASE. In fact, only two 
respondents did not expressly mention safety as a necessary benefit.  
A few examples of statements will illustrate the importance of safety to the interviewees. A Judicial 
interviewee said, “the closer the purpose and effect of the system is to improving public safety, the 
better on all accounts.” From a Law Enforcement interviewee: “anything to help reduce speed and 
crashes is a good thing.” As expected, Public Health interviewees focused the most on safety, and these 
interviewees described a diverse array of potential benefits, from protecting “vulnerable citizens” to 
“improving livability by reducing speeds,” to “reducing the severity of crashes” to making speed 
enforcement safer for law enforcement officers and highway workers. Non-Enforcement Government 
interviewees also provided stimulating comments regarding safety. These included the role ASE might 
play in improving pedestrian and bicycle environments, that ASE has changed driving behavior, and that 
“speed plays a role in one-third of all crashes.” Other comments either suggested or stated that the 
safety benefits would be the key issue for generating and maintaining support for ASE. One interviewee 
thought ASE would be most beneficial if deployed only in conjunction with rigorous statistical analysis, 
and only in “high risk crash areas.” A few Non-Enforcement Government interviewees believed that ASE 
would likely have a positive impact on safety, but that decision-makers would need to see convincing 
results to support deployment. In the words of the interviewee, “if safety numbers are compelling 
enough, all other questions would be addressed.”  
As mentioned previously, there is a substantial body of literature on the positive safety benefits 
associated with automated speed enforcement. This section introduces and reviews only a small part of 
the available literature. The first study of automated speed enforcement in the United States reviewed 
ASE systems deployed in Illinois work zones. Benekohal and colleagues reported that ASE was effective 
in reducing the average speed and increasing compliance with work zone speed limit (49). Speed 
reductions in lanes adjacent to the median were greater than reductions in lanes adjacent to the 
shoulder. In addition, the speed of free-flowing vehicles was more greatly reduced than for vehicles 
traveling in congested conditions. Similarly, the percentage of vehicles exceeding the speed limit near 
speed enforcement programs was reduced from approximately 40 percent to 8 percent for free-flowing 
cars and from 17 percent to 4 percent for free-flowing heavy vehicles. Speed reductions were especially 
apparent near the speed camera—none of the cars exceeded the speed limit by more than 10 mph, and 
none of the heavy vehicles exceeded it by more than 5 mph.  
Hajbabaie and colleagues, studied the sustained and “halo effects” (a continuation of speed reductions 
even after the speed reduction system was removed) of three speed reduction treatments in highway 
work zones (23). The authors compared a speed feedback trailer, a police patrol car, and the 
combination of a police patrol car and a speed feedback trailer. The results indicated that the 
automated enforcement system and the combination of police and automated enforcement treatments 
reduced the mean speed of both the general traffic stream and free-flowing vehicles by about 5 to 7 
mph. Reductions in speed lasted for the duration of the system deployment. The proportion of drivers 
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speeding by more than 10 mph was reduced by 8.7 percent by the ASE system alone and by 8.9 percent 
with a combination of a police vehicle and an ASE system. Hajbabaie et al. also found minimal halo 
effect for the automated system was quite limited in both magnitude of speed reductions and the lanes 
in which speed reductions occurred (e.g., median vs. shoulder lanes). 
Arizona has, arguably, the most well-known ASE systems in the U.S., and as such these systems have 
been frequently reviewed. Shin, Washington, and van Schalkwyk analyzed the impact of ASE on speeds 
ticketed by the Scottsdale Loop system during four periods of deployment, the impact on mean speeds, 
and safety impacts (1). These analyses found that the ASE system reduced the average speed at the 
enforcement camera sites by about 9 mph and reduced the speed dispersion (the variation of speeds 
found on a particular road at the same time) at the enforcement camera sites. The speed reductions 
increased as traffic flow decreased as would be expected based on the relationship between speed and 
traffic flow. Safety impacts were also significant: Depending on the analysis method, the study reports 
that the total number of crashes during non-peak periods decreased by 44 percent to 54 percent. The 
total number of injury crashes decreased by 28 percent to 48 percent, while the total number of non-
injury/non-fatal crashes decreased by 46 percent to 56 percent. Ultimately, the authors estimate that, 
given Arizona-specific crash related injury costs, ASE yields about $17 million in annual safety benefits 
from crash frequency reductions. 
Retting, Kyrychenko, and McCartt evaluated traffic speeds at three locations on the same Scottsdale 
Loop (50). Four data collection points were set at each location, at a range of distances (0.5 mile to 2 
miles) from the ASE camera. Traffic speeds were analyzed 2 months prior to activation of the ASE 
system, and six weeks, five months, and 8 months after system activation. The results suggest that ASE 
along the 8-mile enforcement corridor of the Scottsdale Loop 101 freeway was associated with large 
declines in mean speeds. ASE was also associated with an 88 percent decrease in the odds of vehicles 
traveling 11 mph or more above the 65 mph limit. In addition, speed cameras were associated with a 
halo effect: large reductions in speeding on the same highway but 25 miles away from the camera 
installations. However, the halo effect was limited to the Loop 101, and did not spill over onto other 
parts of the metropolitan freeway network. That traffic speeds increased soon after the pilot program 
was suspended, is another factor the authors believe suggests that ASE is effective.  
Retting, Kyrychenko, and McCartt included random digit dialing telephone surveys of Scottsdale 
residents, and the larger Phoenix metro concerning the Loop 101 speed camera program. The survey 
was conducted both before and while the system was active. Results of the survey suggest that large 
majorities of drivers were aware that ASE was deployed in their area. Drivers were also asked their 
opinion of the ASE system. The proportion of drivers who favored speed cameras increased from 63 
percent before camera enforcement to 77 percent during enforcement. Support for cameras increased 
markedly among drivers ages 35–64 (from 55 percent before enforcement to 78 percent after) and 
declined among younger drivers ages 18–34 (from 53 percent before enforcement to 40 percent after). 
In both surveys, male and female drivers had somewhat similar opinions, and older drivers were most in 
favor of speed cameras. During enforcement, 54 percent of respondents said the system caused them to 
reduce their speed while driving on the Loop 101 in Scottsdale. Of those who reduced their speed, 61 
percent said that the ASE system caused them to reduce their speeds when driving on other sections of 
the Loop 101. Eight months after the system was activated, 71 percent of those surveyed said they 
approved of speed cameras. 
Retting, Farmer, and McCartt studied vehicle speeds six months before and six months after speed 
cameras were deployed in Montgomery County, Maryland (51). In Montgomery County, camera-based 
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enforcement is permitted on residential streets with speed limits up to 35 mph and in school zones. 
Tickets can be issued for vehicles observed traveling at least 10 mph above the speed limit. The study 
conducted telephone surveys before and after implementation to gauge awareness of and attitudes 
toward automated enforcement. The surveys found that nearly three out of four Montgomery County 
drivers thought speeding on residential streets was a problem. Six months after enforcement began, 60 
percent of drivers were aware of the camera program and 62 percent supported it. The authors 
concluded that the camera program was effective at reducing speeding on residential streets where 
deployed. Further, speed reductions outside targeted locations suggest that highly visible automated 
enforcement can promote community-wide changes in driver behavior. In terms of vehicle speeds, 
Retting et al. found that the proportion of drivers traveling more than 10 mph above posted speed limits 
declined by about 70 percent at locations with both warning signs and speed camera enforcement. The 
effect on vehicle speeds when no warning was provided was significantly less. The authors observed a 
39 percent reduction in the proportion of drivers traveling at more than 10 mph above the posted limit 
at locations with warning signs but no speed cameras. The impact of ASE on speeders also lead to a halo 
effect: the proportion of drivers traveling at more than 10 mph above the posted limit dropped 16 
percent on residential streets with neither warning signs nor speed cameras.  
Several researchers evaluated the impact of ASE specifically in work zones. Medina et al. compared the 
effects of automated speed enforcement with a variety of traditional speed reduction treatments 
(speed feedback trailer, presence of police vehicles with emergency lights on and off, and combinations 
of the speed feedback trailer and police presence) on vehicle speeds downstream of the actual 
treatment (52). The results consistently show significant halo effects of ASE systems, while other 
treatments had no significant downstream effects. On average, ASE reduced downstream speeds of 
free-flowing traffic by 2 to 3.8 mph for cars and by 0.8 to 5.3 mph for trucks. The proportion of speeding 
cars was also reduced by 7.1 percent to 23.4 percent, and the proportion of speeding trucks was 
reduced 4.2 percent to 48.3 percent. ASE also reduced the percentage of cars in the general traffic 
stream exceeding the work zone speed limit by more than 10 mph in virtually all cases, and eliminated 
such trucks in all but one case. 
In response to a significant increase in fatal crashes in work zones in 2001 and 2002, Illinois 
implemented an automated enforcement in work zones (49). The system consisted of a mobile van 
equipped with cameras, both down the road and across the road radar, and an officer monitoring the 
equipment. Benekahol et al., studied the impact of this system by comparing vehicle speeds in work 
zones without a mobile automated speed enforcement van, with vehicle speeds in work zones with an 
ASE treatment. The authors found that ASE was associated with reduced average speeds for free-
flowing passenger cars by 6.4 mph in the median lane and by 4.2 mph in the shoulder lane. Additionally, 
ASE was associated with a narrower distribution of speeds, which was more pronounced in median 
lanes than in shoulder lanes. Work zones with the mobile automated speed enforcement vans also saw 
decreases in the percentage of speeding drivers in free flow-traffic from 39.8 percent to only 8.3 percent 
and 27.7 percent to 6.3 percent in congested traffic situations. 
2.3.3 Alliances 
The bottom-right quadrant is titled Alliances, as these facets of ASE represent opportunities to build 
political support for it among various stakeholder groups. The key issues here are implementation 
options and public opinion. 
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2.3.3.1  Implementation Options 
Every stakeholder group used the interviews to pose solutions for deploying an advanced, effective, and 
legal automated speed enforcement system. This topic was by far the most common subject discussed 
by all interviewees. Interviewees shared both their personal opinions, as well as their perceived 
colleagues’ opinions. Because it was such a popular topic, the range of suggestions, ideas, and further 
concerns was vast, and will not be completely reviewed. However, a few conclusions can be drawn from 
the comments. First, both ongoing and advance notice of the deployment of an ASE system are crucial 
to the system’s effectiveness and fairness. Stakeholders appear to believe that notice is defined by more 
than just signs near ASE systems, but also includes widespread publication that the system is deployed 
and education about how the system works, where the system is, and why it is being deployed. Public 
Health stakeholders stressed the importance of education as a part of a three-pronged approach—
engineering, enforcement, and education. 
Second, limited deployment is likely the most acceptable solution in the near term. One example of limit 
deployment is pilot projects to evaluate the benefits of ASE, demonstrate to the public how the system 
works, and acclimate the public to the behavior changes necessary to deploy automated enforcement. 
As one interviewee stated, “pilot projects would be a way for people to get used to it and begin to 
adjust to its impact.” A Non-Enforcement Government interviewee thought that, “starting with State 
Patrol could help, because they have more tools at their disposal—legislative and public awareness and 
education.” Another aspect of limited deployment concerned the precise placement of ASE technology. 
Nearly every interviewee thought that pilot projects in work and school zones would be the best initial 
form of ASE deployment prior to any permanent deployment. Even interviewees who suggested or 
directly stated that ASE is illegal appeared to be open to pilot projects or full-scale deployment in work 
zones and school zones. 
A possible option to address concerns about taking pictures of the driver is for the legislature to impose 
liability on the vehicle owner for any offenses detected by an ASE system, regardless of who was driving 
the vehicle at the time of the offenses. This would be an example of vicarious liability, which is a very 
common, and valid method for imposing liability across the nation that has been upheld in several 
situations (53). By statute in Minnesota, owners are vicariously liable for crimes and torts committed by 
the driver of their vehicle who uses the car with either express or implied permission (54). For example, 
in Minnesota, the owner of a vehicle, even if driven by another, which fails to stop for an extended and 
flashing school bus stop-signal arm, is guilty of a petty misdemeanor (55).  
 
2.3.3.2 Public Opinion 
Like other topics discussed in this study, the stakeholders were unable to express a clear consensus on 
whether the public supports or opposes ASE. In fact, a few interviewees were equivocal in their 
understanding of the public’s opinion. Notwithstanding this ambivalence, the stakeholders generally 
believed certain groups would have strong opinions regarding ASE. For instance, Non-Enforcement 
Government interviewees believed that state department of transportation employees, road 
construction workers, bicyclists and pedestrians, safe community coalitions, and those earning a living 
on the road (i.e., truckers) would strongly support automated enforcement. Groups the interviewees 
thought would oppose ASE included young drivers, drivers with numerous citations, and most 
commuters. Overriding concerns for those opposing ASE typically involved disdain for big government, 
18 
 
and unfair or excessive revenue generation by ASE systems. A Non-Enforcement Government 
interviewee thought that these groups would oppose ASE because of the impacts to “their bank 
accounts, their driving generally, and specifically their commutes.” A Law Enforcement interviewee 
suggested that advocacy groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) might oppose ASE because 
it would reduce the number of officers doing speed enforcement, and thereby reduce the chances of 
catching drunk drivers. 
All stakeholders were more uncertain about the perspective of law enforcement officers. Even the Law 
Enforcement stakeholder group made statements reflecting both support and opposition to automated 
enforcement. A few statements from this stakeholder group are instructive of this equivocation. A high-
ranking Law Enforcement interviewee expressed feeling “pressure to implement” ASE from legislators 
and agency officials. That same interviewee said that “officers on the street” do not feel the same 
pressure, and likely perceive public opinion to be against ASE implementation. A different Law 
Enforcement interviewee had a slightly different point of view, saying that most officers, including those 
in leadership positions, feel no pressure to implement automated enforcement. Law Enforcement 
stakeholders generally believed that most other officers would oppose ASE for three reasons. First, 
speed enforcement is “a huge chunk of what” law enforcement officers do on a daily basis, and thus 
“some would be concerned about what their role is.” Second, any “public backlash against ASE could be 
directed towards officers.” As law enforcement officers already struggle with negative public opinion 
about their role and impact, further negative opinion would only diminish law enforcement’s capacity to 
fulfill its duties. Third, ASE is a potentially disruptive technology and could require significant changes in 
roles and practices. Officers “would not like the change in practices.” 
Although there does not appear to be any research specifically on public opinion and the relation 
between ASE and perceptions of law enforcement, there is research on the public’s opinion of ASE more 
generally. Most studies of automated enforcement systems in the U.S. include a public opinion 
component. A few studies focused entirely on public perception of ASE: Streff and Molnar report that 
the public generally favors use of ASE in select situations, particularly in school zones, in areas where 
traffic enforcement is dangerous for police, for heavy trucks, and in construction zones. Streff and 
Molnar also report greater opposition to ASE from speeders and persons who reported having multiple 
citations in the previous two years. In fact, previous research in Minnesota showed broad public support 
for deployment in work zones and school zones (40).  
A number of national and regional surveys of public opinion indicate that a majority of the public 
supports automated enforcement. In a national survey by NHTSA in 2002, 68 percent of participants 
responded in favor of automated speed enforcement systems targeting drivers going 20 mph or more 
over the posted limit (16). Similarly, 78 percent favored deploying ASE in school zones. In addition, 56 
percent of drivers preferred that citations be issued by taking photos of the driver from the front and 
matching that photo to the driver’s license, but only 32 percent preferred using photos of the rear 
license plate only. Similar surveys in individual jurisdictions report wide ranges of majority support. For 
instance a survey in Washington, D.C reported only 51 percent of respondents supported ASE (56), while 
a survey in Scottsdale, Arizona reported 77 percent of the public supported ASE (57). Public opinions 
polls also reveal some interesting contrasts, for instance female drivers compared to male drivers, and 
those who identify speeding as a problem are more likely to support automated enforcement.  
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2.3.4 Implementation Issues  
2.3.4.1 Financial Issues 
“What to do with the money raised from the citations?” This question abounds in media coverage of 
ASE, as well as in the interviews conducted for this study. Much, if not most of the media coverage 
appears to connect automated speed enforcement with invidious schemes by elected officials to 
generate huge revenues, balance budgets, or to provide private companies lucrative business 
opportunities (58-61). Multiple interviewees mentioned several times the “need to be transparent” 
about how the money generated from automated enforcement is used. Non-Enforcement Government 
and Public Health stakeholders made the vast majority of statements regarding the financial aspects of 
automated enforcement. Non-Enforcement Government interviewees generally expressed opposition to 
ASE when discussing financial matters. Many mentioned how the considerable revenues generated by 
automated systems are “usually” the underlying reason for implementing an automated enforcement 
system. One Non-Enforcement Government interviewee stated that many “legislators don’t believe the 
rationale [for ASE] is improving safety, but instead believe it is for revenue or other reasons.” According 
to another Non-Enforcement Government interviewee, “other states are using it for money, and not for 
enforcement purposes.” A Law Enforcement interviewee believed the public would view the system as 
the “government making money.”  
The few Public Health and Law Enforcement interviewees who mentioned financial issues expressed 
support for ASE. A Public Health interviewee said that automated enforcement “saves money” because 
it is cheaper and safer to deploy than human officers. That same interviewee understood ASE to be a 
good idea because the revenues generated allowed the system to “pay for itself.” Two Law Enforcement 
interviewees suggested that fears of revenue generation were unfounded. These interviewees rejected 
this argument because “that is not the way [the police department] operates.” In other words, law 
enforcement officers in those communities do not enforce speed laws as a means of generating 
revenue.  
The most revealing comment about ASE’s financial impact came from a Non-Enforcement Government 
stakeholder. This interviewee rejected the revenue generation argument because Minnesota law 
prohibits such motives. In the interviewee’s words: “Traffic enforcement is not a money maker for cities, 
[because] the state gets a large share of citation revenue.” Under state law, revenue from all criminal 
and administrative fines is shared between both the local government unit that issued the ticket, and 
the state government. Allocation of fine revenue has several components: the type of fine 
(administrative vs. criminal), who handled the prosecution, who issued the fine, and, in limited cases, 
the specific infraction (62). For instance, in Hennepin County, revenue from the base fine of a speeding 
citation would generally be distributed as follows: 80 percent to Hennepin County, 20 percent to state 
general fund. However, if the County Attorney prosecuted the case, 100 percent of the fine is allocated 
to the state general fund. Administrative sanctions, which differ from criminal fines in that they are 
meant as compensation to the government for harm done to society rather than as punishment, are 
also subject to distribution mandates (63). Two-thirds of a fine collected from administrative fines goes 
to the local government that issued the fine; one third goes to the state general fund. This law would 
very likely prevent, if not act as a significant obstacle to any local government that attempts to use ASE 
as a moneymaker. Further, this same law also restricts the use of this revenue. Subdivision 5(b) requires 
local governments to use one-half of the proceeds of the fine for law enforcement purposes, and fine 
proceeds cannot “supplant” but rather only supplement existing funding (64). Legal restrictions on the 
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use of administrative fines are even more substantial if the citation is issued by the State Patrol. In these 
circumstances, one-third of the fine is distributed to the local government and two-thirds goes to the 
state general fund. 
2.3.4.2 Privacy 
Drivers have only minimal rights to privacy in regards to their movements on public thoroughfares, and 
even less right to protection of information about traffic violations while driving on public roads. The 
right to privacy on public roadways is substantially limited by United States Supreme Court case law. In 
the seminal case U.S. v. Knotts, the court reaffirmed that individuals have 
“a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation . . . . A car has 
little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and 
its contents are in plain view . . . . A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his [or her] movements from one place to another” (65).  
As a result of this and subsequent cases, drivers cannot expect complete privacy of their use of, or 
movement along public roadways. If a driver is using public roadways her or his use can be recorded, 
monitored, and shared in many ways. 
The federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) does, however, limit the use of information collected 
by state traffic and public safety agencies. According to Section 2721(a) of the DPPA, State departments 
of motor vehicles, and anyone employed or contracted by the agency, are prohibited from disclosing 
personal information to anyone (66). Personal information includes,  
“information that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, Social Security Number, 
driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and 
medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving 
violations, and driver's status” (67).  
The DPPA does permit disclosure of personal information (and highly restricted personal information) in 
a limited number of situations. These situations include, but are not limited to: use by a government 
agency including courts and law enforcement agencies (68); use in relation to motor vehicle or driver 
safety and theft (69); and use by insurers in claims investigations, and rating or underwriting (70).  
Analogous to speeding cameras, Mary Lehman reviewed whether red light cameras invade drivers’ right 
to privacy (71). Lehman argues that cameras are not an unconstitutional invasion of privacy for two 
reasons: cameras record information that is in plain view in a public place; and the Supreme Court of the 
United States has long held that drivers do not have a right to privacy on a public street (65).7 Further, 
Lehman contends a driver forfeits their right to privacy by breaking the law when they run a red light. 
Although Lehman includes an interesting discussion on potential alternatives to red-light cameras, she 
ultimately argues that cameras are at least comparable if not typically the better solution. She believes 
that opponents focus on the fear of government control while purposely overlooking the significant 
positive benefits of automated enforcement. 
                                                          
7 Holding that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while traveling by automobile in public 
spaces; e.g., an automobile's movement on public roads, including its arrival at a private residence, is not protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. 
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Nearly every reported case with a challenge to red light cameras or ASE systems based on a privacy 
argument has upheld the system. This includes Fourth Amendment search and seizure challenges; 
general constitutional privacy challenges; infringement of the right to travel; and challenges for 
violations of state Department of Motor Vehicle privacy statutes. 
2.3.4.3 Big Government 
Mistrust of government by members of the public is evident in political rhetoric, mass media coverage, 
and even day-to-day conversations with individual citizens. Distrust of the political and bureaucratic 
system is often raised as the primary concern of those in opposition to automated speed enforcement. 
However, fear of government overreach—colloquially “big government” or “big brother”—was 
mentioned by only three interviewees. One Non-Enforcement Government interviewee cited “trust of 
government” as the issue most commonly raised by his/her colleagues regarding ASE. A Public Health 
interviewee suggested that “libertarian types” believe such programs “[smack] of more government, 
more control, more enforcement.” The most vehement criticism was raised by a Non-Enforcement 
Government interviewee, who expressed the perception that his/her colleagues believed that “[ASE] is 
big government—the only intention is to generate revenue and make money” A Law Enforcement 
interviewee insightfully noted that “limited deployment will look less like ‘big brother’ is ticketing 
everyone.” This limited deployment would help communities and the state generate more support for 
automated enforcement. 
A more common topic was the appropriate level of government to conduct automated enforcement. 
Various stakeholders were concerned about state-level implementation because traffic control 
generally, and speeding in particular, is “a local issue—the city, and only the city should have the option” 
to implement ASE. Another interviewee questioned the ability of cities to undertake an ASE program 
because “most cities have no experience” with the technology and systems required for automated 
enforcement. One Non-Enforcement Government interviewee expressed dissatisfaction with current 
enforcement systems and practices, in particular the alleged failure of the state patrol to issue citations 
for speeding even when Troopers are present in work zones. Finally, a Judicial interviewee was 
particularly happy to have the opportunity to discuss the policy underlying automated enforcement. 
This interviewee stated “judges don’t typically get asked about new laws before they are implemented. 
Policy makers develop the laws/policy, and courts get the law with little input about it.”  
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CHAPTER 3:  QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF ASE IN WORK 
ZONES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Public opinion is favorable to ASE at least on certain roadways. A nationally representative survey found 
a majority believed ASE would be effective in improving road safety and especially supported the use of 
ASE in construction zones (72). Researchers from the University of Minnesota found similar results in a 
2012 public opinion poll of Minnesota residents, as shown in Table 1 (39). By their nature, a work zone 
can be dangerous for police officers. There may be few safe areas to post a police officer or stop speed 
violators. In addition to reducing police visibility, leaving a work zone to issue a ticket poses the extra 
threat of being struck by a passing vehicle (73). Therefore, ASE systems can cite more drivers while 
keeping officers out of dangerous work zones.  
 
Table 1. Impact of Location on Support for ASE in Minnesota 
Automated camera and radar 
devices to monitor speeding... 
“Very 
supportive” 
“Somewhat 
supportive” 
Net “supportive” 
In work/construction zones 57% 26% 83% 
Near schools 59% 22% 81% 
Where many have died 50% 27% 77% 
Where many speed 39% 30% 69% 
On all roads 16% 32% 48% 
(Source: Douma et al. [2012]) 
The goal of this analysis was to compare speed statistics and motor vehicle fatality rates in states that 
deploy ASE in work zones (such as Illinois) to determine if ASE contributes to improved safety in these 
areas. 
 
3.2 METHODS 
We looked into whether there is a quantifiable difference in speeding statistics in Minnesota compared 
with states with ASE. Because data concerning non-injurious speeding violations are typically maintained 
at the county level, due to time and other resource constraints, we examined data on fatalities, which is 
the health impact of speed that we most want to mitigate. While most states provide only general 
fatality data, for the states where ASE was deployed in work zones and evaluated with respect to 
fatalities (e.g., Ohio and Maryland), we present that data. 
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We analyzed work zone and speed-related fatality data from Minnesota and nine states (Arizona, 
Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah and Washington) plus the District of Columbia 
where some form of ASE is being deployed. The first step in comparing motor vehicle fatalities across 
states that utilize ASE in work zones was to look at a broad overview of the states’ fatalities before and 
after ASE implementation. Using Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data from the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, we examined whether states that implement ASE in work zones 
have experienced appreciable differences in work zone-related fatalities. Second, because evaluation 
processes differed so widely state-to-state, we present a verbal summary of specific ASE performance 
reviews in work zones. 
 
3.3 RESULTS 
3.3.1 FARS Data 
Despite the reductions in speeding due to ASE discussed earlier in Chapter 3, few substantial changes in 
traffic fatalities attributable to ASE were identified in this analysis. Between 2004 and 2014, without 
ASE, Minnesota experienced a notable reduction in total traffic fatalities. The nine states and the District 
of Columbia that have ASE all followed the same downward trend as Minnesota, and it is worth 
mentioning that the drop in statewide fatalities began before the 2009 start of the Toward Zero Deaths: 
A National Strategy on Highway Safety campaign (74).  
Similarly, speed-related fatalities dropped between 2004 and 2013 in most of the jurisdictions we 
analyzed, with the notable exceptions of Iowa and Ohio, where speed-related deaths rose, and Utah, 
where they held roughly steady. Overall, these state-level fatality statistics speak to a nationwide 
reduction in traffic fatalities, but shed little light on ASE’s impact.  
Fatality statistics specifically from work zones also do not paint a clear picture. Work zone fatalities 
occur in small numbers (the largest number of such deaths in one year in any of the states examined 
was 38, in Illinois in 2004) and are subject to massive variation (Figure 8). For instance, Washington State 
experienced 16 work zone fatalities in 2006 and just 2 the following year. The District of Columbia had 
either 0 or 1 work zone deaths in every year from 2004 to 2013, making any trends virtually impossible 
to ascertain.  
The contrast between the literature review, which cites numerous studies that identify definitive 
reductions in speeding due to ASE, and our quantitative state-level analysis, which sheds little light on 
ASE’s potential to reduce traffic fatalities, might be due to limitations with FARS data and to the fact that 
the literature review examines very focused studies carried out at scales much narrower than the 
statewide level. ASE has been deployed in a limited fashion in the states examined in this report, 
perhaps not widely enough so that discernible drops in fatalities statewide could be expected. 
Furthermore, fatality statistics are subject to confounding variables. For instance, the drop in motor 
vehicle deaths nationwide between 2004 and 2014 could be partially explained by the decrease in 
vehicle miles driven associated with the Great Recession. Additionally, FARS data just describe fatalities, 
not injuries. 
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Figure 8. Work Zone Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2004-2013 
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3.3.2 Work Zone ASE Evaluations 
Several jurisdictions have deployed ASE in work zones and as a result have experienced a reduction in 
speeds in the ASE enforcement areas (49). Specific evaluations of ASE implementation in work zones are 
discussed in more detail below. To inform Minnesota regarding the possible implementation of ASE 
within the state, we begin by describing its work zone data. 
3.3.2.1 Minnesota 
Minnesota has not deployed ASE systems anywhere, including work zones. Therefore, instead, we 
present current data on crashes and speed in work zones that could be affected by future ASE 
deployment. From 2004 to 2011, there were on average 1,820 work zone crashes per year in Minnesota. 
During this period, work zone crashes represented 2.3 percent of all crashes in the state. Of the work 
zone crashes during this period 0.4 percent were fatal, 30 percent were injury causing, and 69.6 percent 
were property-damage-only. This record is similar to the crash-type distribution seen on all roads 
suggesting that work zones are no safer than Minnesota roads generally (40).  
Table 2 shows the relative frequency of contributing factors cited for work zone crashes (40). For all 
work zone crashes, speeding is the third most frequently cited factor, behind driver distraction and 
following too closely. However, the results show that the more severe the crash, the importance of 
speeding increases. For example, in fatal crashes the importance of speeding as a contributing factor 
increases, and is second only to driver distraction. In addition, the two factors cited more frequently 
than speeding—driver distraction and following too closely—are speed related. That is, as speed 
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increases, so do the dangers of driver distraction and short following distances. Although speeding is not 
the leading cause of work zone crashes, it is a substantial contributor.  
 
Table 2. Contributing Factors Cited in Work Zone Crashes (2003-2012) 
Contributing Factor  All Crashes  
Fatal 
Crashes  
Injury 
Crashes  
  (N=26,224)  (N=107)  (N=8,145)  
Driver inattention or distraction  27% 27% 29% 
Following too closely  19% 2% 17% 
Illegal or unsafe speed  12% 21% 14% 
Failure to yield right of way  8% 4% 8% 
(Source: MnDOT) 
  
From 2003 to 2012, the largest percentage of work zone crashes (41 percent) as well as the largest 
percentage of fatal crashes (36 percent) occurred on interstate highways. State trunk highways were 
also notable in this regard, accounting for 16 percent of work zone crashes and 26 percent of fatal 
crashes. Data on the amount of work zone miles on particular road types was not available, so these 
figures represent the simple, unweighted percentages of all work zone crashes that occurred on a given 
road type. Overall, the Minnesota crash data indicate that speed-related crashes in work zones are an 
important problem and one that ASE could potentially help address.  
Figure 9. Minnesota Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.2 Ohio 
Ohio’s automated speed enforcement program was deployed in 2008. Ohio statutes require that local 
traffic enforcement “[erect] signs giving notice” in order to use photo-monitoring devices (OH ST § 
4511.094) (75). The state legislature made a law that requires that signs be posted about ASE in order to 
do photo enforcement. Unlike other states’ fatality trends, both Ohio’s statewide fatality rate and work 
zone fatalities were on the rise, with work zone fatalities doubling between 2009 and 2011. According to 
the Ohio DOT, excessive speed has contributed to more than 1,500 work zone crashes since 2003 (76). 
Senate Bill 342 requires a police officer to be present during use of ASE. They do not have to issue a 
ticket at the time of the violation, but have to do so within 30 days (77). Ohio does not have specific 
research regarding speeding and ASE use in work zones, but does have data on speeding around work 
zones. They show the 85th percentile before the work zone sign was three to seven mph over the 
original posted speed limit, leading to the 85th percentile speeds being about thirteen to fifteen mph 
throughout the reduced work zone speed limit (78).  
 
Figure 10. Ohio Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.3 Maryland 
Maryland authorized limited use of ASE to specific counties and cities and limited zones within those 
jurisdictions (e.g., work zones and school zones; MD TRANS § 21-809) (75). Maryland’s SafeZones pilot 
ASE program began in October 2009 and began its permanent rotation through work zone sites 
beginning July 1, 2010. Research has shown the SafeZone ASE systems have contributed to a 54 percent 
reduction in the number of vehicles exceeding posted work zone speed limits by 10 mph. By reducing 
the range of speeds among motorists, SafeZone ASE systems have also resulted in more uniform flow 
through work zones. The number of injury-causing crashes in work zones has decreased by 15 percent 
and work zone fatalities decreased by 65 percent in the first three years the program was in place. At 
the same time, work zone crashes across Maryland decreased by 12 percent (79). 
Figure 10. Maryland Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.4 Illinois 
Illinois was the first state to authorize the use of ASE on highway work zones, doing so in 2006. In 2006, 
work zone crashes were just two percent of all Illinois fatalities, but twenty percent of Interstate 
fatalities (80). Although work zone speeds and fines apply whether workers are present or not, ASE can 
be used only when workers are present (625 ILCS 5/11-602; 625 ILCS 5/11-605.1; 625 ILCS 5/11-612; 625 
ILCS 7/) (81). Research has shown the average speed of free-flowing vehicles in Illinois ASE work zones 
decreased between three and eight mph and the proportion of speeders decreased by up to 54 percent. 
Additionally, there was a small halo effect: Speeds were reduced by 2 to 5 mph up to 1.5 miles 
downstream of the ASE vehicle and for an hour after the ASE vehicle was removed (49). In a comparison 
to traditional police presence, Hajbabaie et al. found both significantly reduced speed to an equal 
degree, but the police presence did not result in a significant halo effect (23).  
Figure 11. Illinois Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.5 Iowa 
There were no specific state laws inhibiting the use of ASE in Iowa (75) and ASE cameras were deployed 
in Iowa starting in about 2005 (82). Local jurisdictions could adopt traffic safety statutes and ordinances 
that allow for ASE use as long as they were not “in conflict with the goal of uniformity throughout the 
state” (81). However, in 2014, the Department of Transportation adopted rules that required cameras 
on or next to highways to be justified on an annual basis by showing significant safety improvements 
(e.g., reduced crash rates) (83). Of the five most recently submitted reports made available (2014), all 
speed cameras were approved for continued use (84), indicating continued safety benefits in terms of 
reducing crashes and crash severity. No actual speed data were submitted. 
Figure 12. Iowa Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.6 Arizona 
Investigations show that speeding is pervasive on Arizona highways and worse on high-volume, urban 
interstates (85). ASE in Arizona was piloted for nine months in 2006 before being introduced officially in 
2008. Briefly, evaluation of Loop 101 in Scottsdale, Arizona found that the ASE system reduced the 
average speed at the enforcement camera sites by about nine mph (1) and was associated with an 88 
percent decrease in the odds of vehicles traveling 11 mph or more above the 65 mph limit (50). ASE on 
Loop 101 also resulted in significant safety benefits; Crash frequency reductions due to ASE use on the 
101 loop were estimated to yield savings of about $17 million for the nine-month test period (1).  
The share of drivers favoring the use of ASE actually increased from 63 percent before camera 
enforcement to 77 percent during enforcement. Approval was still high eight months after the system 
was activated (71 percent) (50). Despite the 19 percent reduction in fatal crashes in the first nine 
months of use, the program was shut down in 2010 after Governor Jan Brewer took office (86). The 
statute originally allowing for use of ASE was repealed in 2012 (81). 
Figure 13. Arizona Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.7 Washington 
The Washington State DOT launched its initial ASE pilot project in September 2008. Speed cameras are 
permitted by state statute in school zones, “arterial streets in cities with a population over 5,000,” and 
where local ordinances authorize more expansive use (WA ST § 46.63.170) (75). Excessive speed was a 
contributing factor to 50 percent of traffic fatalities and serious injuries in 2013 (87). Evaluating its pilot 
program, Washington State found the ASE roads experienced lower speeds in general, the number of 
vehicles exceeding 70 mph decreased, and there were no traffic incidents in the area studied as part of 
the pilot program (88).  
Figure 14. Washington State Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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3.3.2.8 Washington D.C. 
Washington, D.C.’s ASE program was launched in 2001 after legislation made it expressly legal (DC ST § 
50-2209.01) (75). Retting and Farmer measured driving speeds at seven sites (of 60) one year before 
deployment and again six months after deployment. They found that mean speeds decreased by a 
statistically significant 14 percent. The proportion of drivers driving more than 10 mph above the speed 
limit was also largely reduced at each study site (56).  
 
Figure 15. Percent of Vehicles Traveling >10 mph above Speed Limit, Washington Camera Sites (from Retting and 
Farmer) 
 
Figure 16. Washington, D.C. Work Zone Traffic Fatalities 
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CHAPTER 4:  QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF GENERAL 
POPULATION ASE CONCERNS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
To better understand the causes for the continued conflict regarding ASE deployment, this study utilized 
a survey with guided and responsive interview methods to examine the perceptions of affected 
stakeholders in Minnesota. The specific purpose was to identify potential avenues for communication by 
which to address points of contention against ASE. Identifying the nuanced perspectives of those who 
are against ASE and where they may be persuaded to shift their opinion will help build more effective 
cases for deploying ASE in the future. 
4.2 METHODS 
Participants were recruited for this online survey from online research portals, like ResearchMatch, and 
on volunteer threads on Craigslist and Reddit. It was described as a study about speed cameras and 
targeted drivers in Minnesota. All participants were entered to win one of four Target gift cards (about 1 
in 50 chance based on expected participation rates). Participants affirmed their consent to participate. 
The survey and recruitment materials were approved by the University of Minnesota Internal Review 
Board. 
All participants were asked basic demographic questions and about their driving habits and history (e.g., 
if they had been in a crash or issued a ticket in the last year). ASE was then defined and participants 
were asked their opinion of it. Specifically, the text read: “Automated speed enforcement involves using 
roadside technologies that combine radar and image-capturing capabilities. These technologies identify 
when a vehicle is speeding and capture an image of the vehicle’s license plates and, if called for, an 
image of the vehicle’s driver. Do you think automated speed enforcement is a good idea?” 
Participants responded to this question on five-item scale: definitely yes, probably yes, unsure, probably 
not, and definitely not. Participants who were in favor of ASE (definitely or probably yes) were asked why 
they are in favor of it and thanked for the participation. Participants who were unsure or reported ASE 
was probably not or definitely not a good idea were presented with a list of nine randomly presented 
topic areas to indicate their primary and secondary reasons for their opposition against ASE. These 
participants were presented a series of tailored questions and prompts based on their top two reasons. 
After the questions and prompts, participants were asked to reevaluate their opinion on ASE using the 
previous scale. 
4.2.1 Issue identification 
The list of reasons offered to participants in the survey was built upon previous work interviewing key 
stakeholders in Minnesota about ASE (see Chapter 2). From these interviews, we identified a list of 
leading reasons stakeholders reported they held and they perceived their colleagues held for opposing 
ASE. To refresh the reader’s memory, the main issues identified include:  
ASE is unconstitutional 
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Many argued ASE is illegal on constitutional grounds, as a matter of fact. Regarding Minnesota 
specifically, some interviewees pointed to a nearly 10 year-old Minnesota State Supreme Court’s ruling 
against the use of red light cameras; notably, that decision was not based on constitutional grounds 
(42). According to one interviewee, this misunderstanding of the ruling is pervasive even among state 
legislators.  
ASE makes the owner of the car responsible for tickets regardless of who is driving 
In certain situations, such as failing to stop for an extended and flashing school bus stop-signal arm, 
Minnesota law holds owners vicariously liable for crimes and torts committed by the driver of their 
vehicle who uses the car with either expressed or implied permission (55). However, the Minnesota 
legislature has not authorized owner-liability for speed violations. In a similar fashion, Minnesota had 
not authorized owner-liability for red-light violations, which was the grounds for overturning the 
Minneapolis automated red-light enforcement ordinance discussed above (40).  
ASE will have negative impact on law enforcement duties 
ASE would affect officers’ ticketing discretion and there is a concern ASE would result in reduction of the 
labor force if ASE is used as the primary traffic controlling force. Officers and other interviews argued 
that ASE would remove the opportunity to find other, more serious violations.  
ASE will not work 
There were concerns that ASE will not be effective in reducing speeds or the likelihood of crashes and 
injuries. As such implementing ASE was thought to be a waste of time and money that should be spent 
elsewhere. 
ASE would not be implemented fairly 
ASE may discriminate against certain races or classes of people depending on deployment location. 
Opponents to ASE also argued that a cited driver is considered guilty upon receiving a ticket and is only 
then given the opportunity to prove their innocence. 
ASE is not supported by the public  
Most were unsure how the general public would feel about ASE, but wagered a majority is against it. 
Groups especially expected to be against it included those who are most likely to be ticketed or care 
about travel time above safety concerns (e.g., young drivers, drivers with numerous citations, and most 
commuters). 
ASE is only to make money for the government 
Opponents had concerns about unfair or excessive revenue collection. Many mentioned how the 
revenues are the underlying goal of ASE implementation, not safety. 
ASE is an invasion of a driver’s privacy 
Many were anxious about the government gathering huge amounts of data on its citizens and their 
driving habits. A few stakeholders also mentioned that pictures of drivers using the roads pose an 
additional privacy problem. 
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ASE expands the reach and control of the government 
General distrust of political systems was often raised as the primary concern of those in opposition to 
ASE. For them, ASE is not about increasing safety; it is about more government and control. 
4.2.2 Questionnaire development  
Using these nine concerns, a series of questions was developed with the intention to engage those who 
were opposed to or unsure about ASE in thoughtful consideration of the issues in two ways. First, we 
asked “consider the opposite” questions. Often people are biased in selecting new evidence and will 
reject information that is contrary to their beliefs, especially related to social issues, and may become 
more polarized in their attitudes (89). A successful strategy in unbiasing people’s acceptance of new 
evidence is through asking them to actively engage in considering the view opposite their own (90). For 
example, for those who expressed the opinion that ASE is just about revenue collection by the 
government, we asked, “What are some potential positives about the increases in revenue ASE would 
bring?” For those who said ASE would have a negative impact on law enforcement, we asked “How 
might ASE help to alleviate some constraints or unwanted duties officers currently have?” These 
consider-the-opposite questions were open-ended with a large text input box for participants to engage 
as much as they wanted with the topic. 
Second, we presented the opportunity to learn more about each topic. It was hoped that the new 
information would help correct some misguided perceptions (e.g., in reality, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled we do not have a right to privacy on public roads). Sometimes facts were embedded in the 
question itself, such as this question from the “ASE will not work” category, when we asked, “If the 
general public knew how speed affects the frequency and severity of crashes, do you think they would 
be less likely to speed?” Or, as another example, “Would you change your position if you knew that a 
recent public opinion survey showed overwhelming public support for deployment of ASE in work and 
school zones?” in the public support category. Other times we asked if they would like to learn more 
information about a specific topic: “Would you like to learn about a recent public opinion survey about 
ASE support?” or “Would you like to learn about some pilot ASE data from the United States?” When 
they did want to know more, the information was presented in simple paragraph form and we asked 
whether and how their opinions of that contention changed. At the end of the survey, they were asked 
to report their stance on ASE as a whole on the same, previous 5-point Likert scale. 
The questions and logic chains were piloted among undergraduate students and other staff at the 
University of Minnesota. Revisions were made to ensure clarity and a lack of obvious bias in the 
questions.  
4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 Demographics  
There were 216 surveys initiated, which resulted in 203 complete participant responses. Most 
participants who dropped out of the study did so in the first few demographic questions. There were no 
differences between completers and non-completers based on available data (i.e., age, gender, licensed 
years, and education level). Nearly all participants were from Minnesota (95.5 percent). The remaining 
participants represented Region 5 states (Ohio, Illinois, Michigan Wisconsin, and Indiana) and one 
participant was a resident of Arizona. Most participants were female (72 percent) and ranged in age 
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from 18 to 84 (Mean=43.9, Standard Deviation=15.7). The participants had held a driver’s license for an 
average of 27.7 years (Standard Deviation=15.9). Number of licensed years was highly correlated with 
age (R2=0.99).  
Of the 203 responses, 100 had favorable opinions on the use of ASE upon entering the survey. Using an 
ordinal logistic regression model and adjusting for gender, driving frequency, and education, those in 
favor of ASE were more likely to be older (p=0.032), while those not in favor of ASE had driven more 
miles in the past year (p=0.042). There were no differences in baseline ASE opinion by gender, 
education, or driving frequency. Of the remaining 103 who did not have a favorable opinion of ASE at 
the start of the survey, 30 were unsure about the use of ASE, 30 thought it was probably not a good 
idea, and 43 thought ASE was definitely not a good idea (Figure 18).  
After engaging with the survey materials, 54 people did not change their opinion of ASE (13, 13, and 28 
maintained their stance of unsure, probably not, or definitely not, respectively). There were 49 
“movers”: 31 moved to having a positive opinion of ASE; 7 reported feeling unsure after previous 
negative opinions of ASE; and 11 moved to a more negative opinion of ASE. Chi-square analyses show 
that the amount of movement was statistically significant, χ2(8, n=103)=52.72, p<0.001.  
 
Figure 17. Movement on “Do you think automated speed enforcement is a good idea?” 
 
Controlling for gender, age, and miles driven over the past year, an ordinal logistic regression model 
showed that those with higher education attainment were more likely to move in a positive direction 
regarding their ASE opinion (p=0.033), while those who drove more frequently were more likely to move 
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in a negative direction (p=0.027). Comparing non-movers to only those who moved toward a more 
positive opinion of ASE, chi-square analyses show there was no statistically significant difference in 
terms of age, education, or average miles driven. However, those who made a positive change were 
more likely to be female, χ2(1, n=91)=4.30, p=0.038.  
4.3.2 Themes associated with moving toward positive ASE beliefs  
4.3.2.1 Safety 
Positive-changers responded more enthusiastically to information about the safety impacts of speed. 
This is illustrated by some of these respondents saying they would be most moved if they saw data 
suggesting significant benefits. Explaining why it would improve their opinion of ASE, respondents said 
evidence like that is persuasive: “Data-driven decision making makes this more acceptable to me” and 
“results prove more progress than anything.” ASE would also be more acceptable if they are “…able to 
show that the ASE programs have a significant impact on crashes and fatalities OR that fewer people are 
speeding/instances of ticketing declines in areas with ASE.” When asked about the potential uses the 
revenue generated from ASE, positive-changers were still very safety-focused. Besides using the money 
to fix roadway infrastructure, one respondent said, “The revenue should go back into safety and 
engineering programs or be made available to help support crash victims and their families. Or possibly 
education interventions.” Another wrote, “If it is just being done to increase revenue I would not 
support it. It should be done only as a public safety measure.” Among those who were already positive 
on ASE, a majority highlighted safety concerns as part of their reasons for supporting it. 
Positive-changers also more explicitly recognized the importance of speed in work and school zones. 
When asked, “What effects do you think speeding has on the safety of school and work zones?” 
positive-changers said “It endangers the workers and children when people speed in those zones” and 
“It causes an unsafe environment for all involved.” On the other hand, those whose opinion on ASE 
stayed the same were more vague, saying speeding was “bad to an extent” or had “a big effect” in these 
areas. One non-mover further clarified, “there are already plenty of deterrents in place [in school and 
work zones]. Additional technology and tax payer money isn't needed.” Still, in the open-ended 
comments at the end, many non-movers indicated their approval of limited deployment to school and 
work zones: “…School zones and work-zones are something I would consider, but that's it” and “School 
and work zones should be the limit of use.” Furthermore, although speeders make up the majority of 
the driving population, the majority may be convinced that targeting excessive speeders with ASE would 
be acceptable. In response to, “Would you be more likely to support ASE if tickets were only issued to 
the worst violators? (e.g., those going more than 15 mph over the speed limit),” two-thirds of both 
positive changers and non-changers said they would (none of the 11 negative changers were directed to 
this question). 
4.3.2.2 More engagement 
Those who moved toward more positive beliefs about ASE showed more active engagement with 
consider-the-opposite questions. The written responses from the positive-changers more frequently had 
substantive thoughts compared to the negative and non-movers. More often negative and non-movers 
did not input any answer or wrote simply “no” or “none,” etc. It appears the positive-changers actually 
considered the opposite of the subject matter more thoroughly; however, we do not know the causal 
direction here. The positive-changers may have already been more willing to entertain positive thoughts 
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about ASE (i.e., had more open minds) and therefore engaged more on these questions. On the other 
hand, the engagement prompted by the consider-the-opposite questions may have (as proposed in 
theory) reduced initial biases toward ASE (i.e., created more open minds) and helped move them 
toward their more positive ASE beliefs.  
4.3.3 Themes associated with negative or no movement on ASE beliefs  
4.3.3.1 Constitutionality 
Correcting the belief that ASE is unconstitutional or illegal did not create change in people’s opinion who 
thought it was unconstitutional. Instead, a number of respondents appeared to rely on their own 
opinion of what was constitutional, saying “it seems to violate my rights as a driver” or “I am not sure 
that I would ever find it to be constitutional.” Many wanted the United States Supreme Court to weigh 
in on the topic before they would change their mind about its constitutionality.  
4.3.3.2 Penalty dilemma 
Regarding the current legislation that would make the owner of the car responsible for ASE-issued 
tickets, respondents appeared to experience a “penalty dilemma.” Respondents disliked how the owner 
of a car would be ticketed regardless of who was driving. At the same time, they showed little support 
for the alternative, namely, taking a picture of the driver. While positive-changers were more open to 
the idea, some non-movers and negative-changers had experienced difficulty in the past trying to 
correct errors with red-light camera photos and worried the same problems would persist with ASE. One 
related, “When thinking about it, my picture could be mistaken for many people. (Sister, cousin, etc.) So 
it would be very difficult to prove who the driver is with a picture of a speeding vehicle...” Another said, 
“My daughter, who looks very similar to me, ran a red light in a car registered to both her and I in [San 
Diego], CA where they use automated enforcement. I was falsely ticketed. It was a nightmare trying to 
get it straightened out from MN. Cameras should be a supportive tool; they cannot replace officers.”  
Physical police presence desired 
Respondents from all change categories noted the potential for reducing discrimination and other biases 
from ticketing when using ASE speed algorithms. However, non-movers still favored keeping the human 
element in ticketing: “I feel that we need the human element in public service and law enforcement for 
it to be successful,” adding, “Please keep in mind this is coming from someone with a Mathematics 
degree who loves logic and equality.” One said, “Whenever you take the human factor out of the 
equation you eliminate an important element in law enforcement and take another step closer to 
dividing the populace from the government. We need more humanity, not less.” Another non-mover 
said, “I think it is a necessary thing to have the Police visible on the roads. I feel that a machine taking 
pictures and sending out tickets to drivers is unfair.” Another preferred the potential for police 
discretion, saying they dislike a “blanket response to a violation when not all situations are the same.”  
4.3.3.3 Have other priorities 
Several respondents did not understand the attention speeding is receiving when there are other more 
pressing, safety-related issues at hand. A non-changer asked, “Why are we concerned with speeding 
when there are MANY more problematic driving behaviors that need to cease first. Distracted driving 
(texting, using a cell phone), running red lights, not stopping for pedestrians, etc., are much higher of a 
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concern for me than speeding.” A negative-changer said ASE is a “Waste of time and money. How about 
using that money to stem the tide of gun violence?” Another said, “I don't think that this is a good use of 
taxpayers' money or of law enforcement's time. There are far more important issues than speeding 
drivers.”  
4.3.3.4 Denying speed impacts  
Some negative- and non-changers provided grossly inaccurate statements regarding the impact of 
speeding, saying speed is not a factor in crashes or their severity. Specifically, one said, “speed is seldom 
the underlying issue in driving accidents.” Another said, “Speed has never killed anyone, [it’s] suddenly 
becoming stationary that kills.” In fairness, they shared these thoughts before being presented 
questions and information that demonstrated the safety significance of not speeding. But, despite 
receiving the safety information, they did not accept the safety benefits of reduced speeds nor did they 
change their opinion to favor the use of ASE. In fact, one negative-changer reiterated his disbelief about 
the impact of speed in the final question where respondents could add any other thoughts they had on 
the subject. He said, “[ASE] is a wasted avenue. Speed is too small a portion of the root cause of traffic 
accidents and fatalities.” 
4.3.4 Opportunities & Recommendations  
Advocating for automated speed enforcement remains difficult and controversial. In part, 
because nearly everyone speeds at some point, speeding is not an ‘everybody else’ problem. As 
such, speeders are not a marginalized minority of the population and a majority needs to perceive 
ASE as a useful endeavor in order to successfully promote it. The current study shows that a 
significant portion of people who are against or unsure about ASE can be persuaded to think 
better of it by addressing their key concerns. While this method did not move everyone to a 
positive opinion of ASE, most were not further polarized into rejection of ASE, indicating a 
good dialog was achieved and further entrenchment into negative views was not a result of the 
engagement with most of the participants. Findings show some differences with regard to who 
may be more open to supporting ASE. 
4.3.4.1 Age gap 
Older respondents were more favorable on the use ASE. This is similar to previous polling of opinion of 
evidence-based road safety policies; Munnich and Loveland found a statistically significant generational 
difference in support of ASE in their national public opinion survey (72). Support for ASE was 
approximately 60 percent for those aged 18 to 54 and jumped to 67 percent among 55-64 year olds and 
79 percent among people aged 65 or older. Because younger drivers are more likely to be involved in 
speed-related crashes (10), it is important to develop communication strategies about speed and safety 
that target younger drivers.  
4.3.4.2 Gender gap 
Although the baseline ASE opinion of respondents was not different by gender, females were more likely 
to move to having a favorable ASE opinion after engaging with the survey materials. Similarly, Munnich 
and Loveland found a significant gender gap in their polling; they found 72 percent of surveyed women 
to be in favor of ASE compared to 56 percent of men (72). Because men are more likely to be involved in 
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a speed-related crash (10), the current study highlights the potential difficulty of convincing this group 
of the impact of the utility of ASE. Taken together, special communication strategies need to be 
considered to reach younger drivers and especially younger, male drivers. 
4.3.4.3 Highlight safety impacts  
The findings of this research support concentrating public awareness campaign efforts on how speed 
affects crashes. Doing so will have a two-pronged effect that will serve as a foundation for future ASE 
discussions. First, it will help create an environment in which speeding is understood to be a serious 
problem. Second, akin to the hazards of secondhand smoke, speeders will be seen as an endangerment 
to others. Together, the safety benefits of not speeding and the denigration of speeders will serve as a 
strong foundation to make the case for the use of ASE to effectively address speeding.  
Thus, a major stumbling block for promoting ASE, or speed compliance in general, is the lack of public 
awareness of the relationship between speeds and road safety. Indeed, ASE advocates and other 
stakeholders are themselves probably not aware that some of the public denies the safety impacts of 
speeding. As can be noted from the methodology section above, the initial stakeholder interviews did 
not identify lack of awareness of the dangers of speeding as a reason to oppose ASE. Accordingly, it is 
key that campaigns promoting ASE do not assume the public knows about the risks of speeding and/or 
believes it to be a dangerous behavior. Findings from this study suggest that communication strategies 
should feature the risks of speeding, highlighting its impact on rates of injury and fatalities in motor 
vehicle crashes. The lack of information about the importance of speed in public sphere probably also 
fuels the perception that negative-changers and neutral respondents shared that speeding should be a 
low priority, if a priority at all. For instance, some respondents who did not support ASE cited distracted 
driving or non-roadway related issues as a higher priority for attention than speeding.  
Periodic “speed kills” campaigns occur, but the results of this study show that either the information has 
not been sufficiently disseminated, is overshadowed by other campaigns and media, or the information 
is not being believed. Indeed, recent media campaigns on the dangers of distracted driving may be to 
blame, in part, because they miss or overshadow the impact of speeding. Data from the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration details that driving too fast for conditions or in excess of posted 
speed limits was a factor in 18.8 percent of fatal motor vehicle crashes compared with distracted driving 
(e.g., being on the phone, eating, or talking), which was a factor in just 6.7 percent of fatal roadway 
crashes (10).  
Furthermore, in this study, there is some evidence of mistrust in government when it comes to the 
reasons behind speed limits. One respondent said frankly, “governmental transparency is sham [sic].” 
Those who did change their opinion on ASE were more likely to say that transparency regarding speed 
limits would be useful whereas most of the non-changers said transparency would not matter. If these 
skeptics are to be reached at all, the information about speed limits and safety effects will probably 
need to come from independent, non-governmental bodies that will not benefit from ticket revenue. 
Overall, the success among the positive-changers and lack of movement among the others highlights the 
need for better public understanding and awareness of speed’s impact on road crashes before making 
the argument for ASE. Questions that remain to be addressed by those campaigning for ASE include: 
How do we get safety information out there? Similarly, how do we convey that speed limits are 
meaningful? And, who will convey this information in a trustworthy and effective manner? Effective 
communication of the direct relationship between speed and safety is key to framing the debate over 
the usefulness of ASE. 
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4.3.4.4 Avoid talking politics  
In contrast with the change seen as a result of discussing the safety impacts of speeding, engaging with 
participants on the politics or the legality of ASE did not tend to make its deployment more acceptable. 
Explicitly detailing how ASE has not been deemed unconstitutional did not convince respondents that it 
was constitutional. Explaining that the Supreme Court has ruled that privacy is not to be expected on 
public roads did not reassure those with privacy concerns. Likewise, describing the extensive privacy 
safeguards in place for any ASE-related photos did not mitigate privacy anxieties. Therefore, public 
education campaigns about the legality of ASE or about privacy rights and protections are not expected 
to be worthwhile campaigns. 
4.3.4.5 Consider limited deployment 
There is broad support for limited forms of ASE deployment. Even among respondents who did not 
change their unsure or negative opinion, there was a positive response to limited deployment in school 
and work zones. Many explicitly volunteered that they were against ASE in all forms except for these 
extra high-risk areas. Research among other Minnesotans39 and nationally representative surveys (72) 
have broad support for ASE near schools (81 percent and 87 percent, respectively), on roads where 
many people have died (77 percent and 81 percent), and on roads where many speed (69 percent and 
75 percent). Although speeders make up the majority of the driving population, the majority may be 
convinced that targeting excessive speeders with ASE would be acceptable. Respondents were in favor 
of ASE when it would target those traveling 15 mph or more over posted speed limits. Previous polling 
of Minnesotan drivers also showed a majority support ASE use for extreme speeds (71 percent) (39). 
Consequently, in order to have the most public support, ASE use should be initially introduced to 
selected high-risk areas and/or target only excessive speeders. 
Note benefits to law enforcement 
To address the public’s concerns regarding the dynamic between ASE and law enforcement, it should be 
stressed that ASE will not replace all police enforcement. First, emphasize its limited deployment. 
Second, as many respondents pointed out, there are other criminal issues police need to attend to (e.g., 
catch drunk or reckless drivers) that will ensure their continued presence on the road. ASE 
implementation should actually help increase their attention to these matters because they can spend 
less time ticketing speeders. Third, police will be employed to monitor ASE processes to make sure 
errors do not happen. Hence, law enforcement will not be diminished and can actually be supported 
through the use of ASE. 
4.3.5 Limitations and future directions   
Many respondents reported they learned about ASE for the first time via this survey and desired more 
information before making more formal decisions about its use. The survey targeted the MN population 
where ASE is not in place. Despite the ongoing controversy and vocal opponents of ASE in the state, 
there is a lack of awareness of what automated speed enforcement is and how it could benefit drivers 
and communities. This study may have proceeded differently if respondents had been familiar with ASE. 
Nonetheless, it offers insights into how a population without much knowledge of ASE responds to it and 
thus where campaign and advocacy groups should focus their initial efforts to gain support. Future 
research with a well-informed population may result in different turning points on ASE opinions. This or 
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a similar survey could be performed in other states were ASE is more prevalent (e.g., Arizona and 
Illinois) in order to prepare communication strategies during later stages of ASE deployment.  
The current study design affected results in two ways. First, respondents did not receive all of the same 
information. Each person’s survey was tailored to his or her top two reasons for not holding a favorable 
opinion of ASE. It is possible that more positive movement could have been initiated if all had been 
given information about the link between speeding and crash rates. Additionally, the tailoring meant 
that there were smaller numbers of respondents in each category with which to make comparisons. 
Future studies with larger sample sizes may yield further insight into the interaction between additional 
points of contention against ASE and the ability to shift opinions through engagement with this method. 
Second, the format of the survey allowed respondents to leave open-ended questions blank. More often 
negative and non-movers did not supply any answer or wrote simply “no” or “none,” etc. Some people 
may have been more active in participation had the “consider the opposite” activity not been an online 
survey. For example, an in-person interview could have elicited more engagement; however, in taking 
the interactive human element out of the equation, the engagement was potentially more effective 
because it was less emotionally laden (i.e., less combative).  
A final point to remember is that while this information could contribute to better public understanding 
and support of ASE, the Minneapolis case discussed above remains an example of how a small group 
opposing ASE can still prevent its implementation if the implementation is not designed to meet legal 
requirements, as discussed by Adams (6) and Douma (39, 40).  
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
Automated speed enforcement is controversial despite its significant potential to deter speeding and 
reduce traffic deaths. In this study, we looked to identify the basis for public opposition to ASE and 
determine how entrenched that opposition is. Through stakeholder interviews and public surveys, we 
found that negative perceptions of ASE are often related to misunderstandings about the 
constitutionality of ASE and the public safety threat posed by speeding. Concerns about big government 
and use of revenues generated by ASE are also not uncommon. 
Framing the use of automated speed enforcement as a clear and effective safety tool to address a 
profound public health problem will increase public support for its deployment. Because large majorities 
in several surveys approve of its use in high-risk areas like school and work zones and where people 
often speed excessively, limited ASE deployment may be a useful foothold to gaining even more support 
for expanded use.   
Thoughtful consideration must go into designing effective communication campaigns about speed and 
its effects on car crash fatality rates and injury severity. Extensive work should be done to understand 
the barriers to unbiased consumption of educational materials and media to prevent the unintended 
consequence of further entrenchment and flat out rejection of the information that such campaigns 
may encounter. Campaigns will probably need special communication strategies to reach younger and 
male drivers. Connecting speed and its effects on road safety in the minds of the public will enable a 
more conducive environment for the deployment of more effective enforcement tools, including 
automated speed enforcement.  
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